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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
BRIAN STARKEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 980317-CA 
Priority 2 (Incarcerated) 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Power to hear and decide this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by 
provision of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS 
1. Does the evidence supported defendant's conviction on the charge of 
Assault by a Prisoner? The function of a reviewing court is limited to insuring that there is 
sufficient competent evidence regarding each element of the charge to enable a jury to find, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. On this level, this issue 
presents a question of law. See State v. Warden, 813 P.2d 1146 (1991). 
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2. Does the evidence support defendant's conviction on the charge of Threat 
Against Life or Property? Question of law. See State v. Warden, supra. 
3. Was there prejudicial error in the introduction of "prior bad acts" evidence 
and the interjection of comments which the court itself made re defendant's possible 
culpability in the commission of other criminal offenses? See State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 
(Utah 1997) (appellate court will review the trial court's rulings on these issues more closely 
than ordinary rulings on relevance and with a limited deference). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED1 
§ 76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, 
that causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to 
another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if the person causes 
substantial bodily injury to another. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused 
caused serious bodily injury to another. 
§76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner. 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause 
bodily injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 1953,as Amended. 
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§ 76-5-107. Threat against life or property — Penalty. 
(1) A person commits a threat against life or property if 
he threatens to commit any offense involving violence with 
intent to: 
(a) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer 
agency organized to deal with emergencies; 
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily 
injury; or 
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or 
room; place of assembly; place to which the public has access; 
or aircraft, automobile, or other form of transportation. 
(2) A threat against life or property is a class B 
misdemeanor, except if the actor's intent is to prevent or 
interrupt the occupation of a building, a place to which the 
public has access, or a facility of public transportation operated 
by a common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction entered in the Fifth 
Judicial District Court, Iron County, the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite presiding, 
adjudging defendant guilty of Assault by a Prisoner, a third degree felony, in violation of 
§ 76-5-102.5; Interference with Arresting Officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
§ 76-8-305; and Threat Against Life or Property, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of 
§ 76-5-107. 
Course of Proceedings in Lower Court. Defendant was initially charged with Assault by 
a Prisoner, a third degree felony; Damaging a Jail, a third degree felony; Interference with 
Arresting Officer, a class B misdemeanor (two counts); Threat Against Life or Property, a 
class B misdemeanor (five counts); and False Personal Information to Peace Officer, a class 
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C misdemeanor. R 1-4. Following preliminary hearing, the defendant was held to answer 
the charges of Assault by a Prisoner, one count of Interference with Arresting Officer, and 
one count of Threat Against Life or Property. R 40-41. All other charges were dismissed. 
Disposition in the Lower Court. Defendant was convicted of those charges he was held 
to answer, was sentenced according to statute, and is presently incarcerated at the Utah State 
Prison. R 151-54. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
In the early evening of February 25,1998, law enforcement officers converged 
upon a residence located in Enoch, Utah, for the purpose of attempting to execute a warrant 
for the defendant's arrest on a charge of attempted aggravated assault, a class A 
misdemeanor. R 181, at 36-37. Officers were acting upon what they described as Man 
anonymous call." R 181, at 36. 
The ranking officer, Deputy Brett Allred, was acquainted with the defendant 
as a result of prior law enforcement activities which included an incident involving a prior 
disagreement with the defendant and another incident in which the defendant was a 
complaining witness. Allred was concerned about the possibility that the defendant would 
attempt to flee and therefore made plans for the execution of the arrest warrant accordingly. 
R 181, at 34-38. 
Deputy Scholosser, who did not know the defendant, initiated contact with the 
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occupants of the dwelling while other officers positioned themselves so as to be able to 
observe anyone leaving the residence through the rear door or to intercept anyone attempting 
to flee by way of the nearby state highway. R 181, at 13-14. The individual who answered 
the door identified himself as "Doug" and advised Scholosser that the defendant had been 
at the residence earlier but was no longer there. R 181, at 16. This person was later 
identified as the defendant, Brian Starkey. R 181, at 15. The defendant made his way to the 
rear sliding door and attempted to leave the area, apparently on a dead run. 
Deputy Allred observed the defendant as he exited the residence and hailed 
him. R 181, at 39,156. The defendant stopped and immediately reached into his waistband 
which, he later testified, was intended and did in fact convey the false impression that he was 
reaching for a firearm. R 181, at 39. Allred warned the other officers: "He has a gun." R 
181, at 40. With this, apparently all of the responding officers drew their weapons. R 181, 
at 41. Deputy Jody Edwards, whose personal residence was located in the same 
neighborhood, approached carrying a shotgun. The record indicates that there was some 
question about whether or not Edwards actually discharged his weapon during the incident. 
R 181, at 174-75. At any rate, the level of hostility between Edwards and the defendant 
immediately escalated with Edwards' arrival. R 181, at 44-46. 
The defendant stood on muddy ground as the officers shouted directives 
concerning the necessity of his discarding the perceived weapon and showing the officers his 
hands. R 181, at 42, 46. Upon receiving assurances from Allred that we would not be 
tackled and that he would be allowed to walk to the pavement before getting down on the 
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ground, the defendant complied with the officers' requests and was taken into custody 
without further incident. R181, at 42-44. A search of his person and the area indicated that 
he had not been in possession of a firearm. R 181, at 46. 
Following his arrest the defendant verbally abused the officers. R 181, at 41. 
These insults continued for a few minutes outside the Enoch residence while the defendant 
awaited transport. At this point in time the defendant and Deputy Edwards became 
embroiled in a bitter argument, during which the defendant is reported to have made a 
statement which he directed toward Deputy Edwards to the effect that "he would put a 
contract out on Deputy Edwards just like he did his brother." Edwards' response to this 
outrage with a single word: "Whatever." R 181, at 49. The defendant was thereafter 
transported to the Iron County Correctional. 
During booking on the misdemeanor warrant, Deputy Allred began preparing 
paperwork which would facilitate the defendant's detention on additional offenses allegedly 
committed in the course of his arrest and raise his bail. During this process, the defendant 
insulted Deputies Allred and Brown, telling them that he would get Allred's job and his 
stripes and "basically stat[ed] that [Allred] and Deputy Brown didn't know what [they] were 
doing." R 181, at 52-53. 
Deputy Brown became annoyed by defendant's pacing back and forth and 
refusal to remain standing in the location designated by the officers. R181, at 52-53. Brown 
issued more directives to which the defendant responded with obscenities. This escalated 
into a face-to-face confrontation between Brown and the defendant. Deputy Allred 
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approached the defendant and with Deputy Brown "took the defendant to the ground." R 
181, at 189. It was during this process that Allred and Brown contend the defendant 
attempted to "head butt" Deputy Allred. 
The events of that evening resulted in the filing of two felony and eight 
misdemeanor charges against the defendant. He was held to answer three of them: Assault 
by a Prisoner, a third degree felony; Interference with Arresting Officer, a class B 
misdemeanor; and Threat Against Life or Property, a class B misdemeanor. He was tried and 
convicted on all three charges and appeals. R 92-93. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence offered in support of the charge of Assault by a Prisoner was 
insufficient to establish with any confidence just how it was that defendant's body came into 
contact with Deputy Allred's person, what part of defendant's body made contact, or whether 
the defendant, who clearly did no injury to the deputy, was in fact attempting to injure him. 
The proof offered in support of the charge of Assault by a Prisoner does not 
evidence a settled purpose to terrorize. It is nothing more than "idle talk" which may have 
been insulting, but which, given its context and the frame of reference which the defendant 
himself supplied, the statement was not reasonably issued or understood as a real threat of 
imminent serious bodily injury. 
Finally, the record contains numerous accusations and allusions to defendant's 
alleged prior criminal activity which without question were prejudicial and require reversal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONVICTION OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD. 
Section 76-5-102.5 defines the elements of the offense of assault by a prisoner 
by incorporating those elements of simple assault, enhancing the penalty for such an assault 
to a third degree felony when it is committed by a "prisoner." The section includes one 
important limitation on an across the board incorporation of § 76-5-102, the code section 
which defines "assault" and outline the elements thereof; an assault will not provide the 
requisite factual predicate for a charge filed under § 76-5-102.5 unless it was committed with 
the actual "inten[t] to cause bodily injury." 
Under § 76-5-102(1), there are three alternative ways in which a criminal 
assault is committed: (a) "attempting], with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury 
to another; (b) "threat[ening], accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another;" and (c) "committ[ing an act,] with unlawful force or violence, that 
causes or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another." 
The defendant concedes that a prisoner who commits a simple assault which 
satisfies the each of the elements of alternative "a" may be appropriately convicted of the 
greater offense defined by § 76-5-102.5, because one cannot "attempt" to do that which he 
does not "intend" to do. 
Alternative "b" involves those scenarios in which the offender issues a "threat" 
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to do bodily injury and exhibits the means to carry the threat out forthwith. While such a 
threat may not in all cases be verbalized, this alternative clearly has no application to the 
facts of the instant case as the only thing which the prosecution could possible advance as 
a purported "threat" is the act which the state contends constituted an actual attempt to do 
injury. 
A scenario which constitutes an assault under alternative "c" does not 
necessarily satisfy the factual predicate for the application of § 76-5-102.5 because under § 
76-5-102(l)(c), a misdemeanor assault can be made out upon the proof of a blameworthy 
state of mind which is arguably as low as "criminal negligence," and certainly no greater than 
"recklessness." The enhanced penalty imposed under § 76-5-102.5 can be invoke only in 
those cases in which the perpetrator is a prisoner and acts with the actual "inten[t] to cause 
bodily injury " to another. 
In the instant, the evidence which the state offered to prove an intent to do 
bodily injury is found in the testimony of Deputies Allred and Brown. Allred provided the 
following details of the altercation in preadmissions: 
Q. Did you move or attempt to — 
A. I was to the side. 
Q. Now, was he actually trying to hit you with his head or 
his shoulder? 
A. I believe his head. 
Q. BY THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR: Now, that was sort 
of a gentle shrugging of my shoulder. [Describing what 
had been just demonstrated for the jury.] Is that the type 
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of thrust that you experienced? 
A. More powerful than that. 
Q. And what happened to you when he thrust towards you? 
A, When he hit my shoulder — I'm not sure if it was his 
head or his shoulder.... 
R181, at 52-56. 
Under cross-examination, Deputy Allred testified: 
Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] And this - what he 
described as a "head butt," he barely brushed you; is that 
correct? 
A. [BY DEPUTY BRETT ALLRED] He made contact with 
my shoulder. Not a brush. 
Q. He made contact, but it certainly wasn't very hard, was 
it? 
A. There was some force behind it. 
Q. Okay. So at the preliminary examination you testified he 
didn't hit you hard. 
A. Yes. 
R 181, at 72-73. 
Apparently, Deputy Allred either did not see the defendant attempt this so-
called "head butt," or could not remember whether the defendant made contact with his head 
or his shoulder. R 181, at 56. When the state's prosecutor attempted to elicit testimony 
concerning any evasive action the deputy had taken which had allowed him to escape without 
any injury whatsoever, Deputy Allred explained: "I was to the side." R 181, at 56. The 
record does not clearly indicate that Allred was required to take any action to avoid the injury 
which he contended the defendant most certainly intended to inflict, as evidenced by the fact 
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that the defendant "made contact" with the deputy's shoulder with "his head or his shoulder." 
Inasmuch as Deputy Allred suffered no injury as a result of this "attack," the 
state's prosecutor was allowed, over defendant's objection, to elicit Allred's opinion "as to 
whether or not if [the defendant] had been successful in striking the front of [the deputy's] 
head," Allred would have suffered "[b]ruising, [and] a small cut." R 181, at 86-87. Allred 
testified that he had never actually been or seen someone else "head butted." R 181, at 86. 
Brown also testified that the defendant attempted to "head butt" Allred, but 
clarified the factual basis underlying his otherwise conclusory accusation when, upon cross-
examination, he explained: 
Q. [BY DEFENSE COUNSEL] And do you remember 
testifying that you didn't remember seeing Mr. Starkey come 
into contact with Deputy Allred? 
A. [BY DEPUTY BROWN] Let's see. Yeah, I remember 
turning around and grabbing ahold of his arm. I was on the left 
side of him, and we were putting him on the ground at that time. 
As he done that he went forward. 
As far as physical contact, I don't remember actually 
seeing physical contact. There was a lot of movement between 
all three of us at that time. 
Q. Okay. So you don't know if there was any contact. 
A. Not 100 percent sure. 
Q. At this point in time when this alleged head butt took place, 
Mr. Starkey was handcuffed, correct? 
A. Yes, he was. 
R 181, at 102-103. 
James Cook, a corrections officer at the Iron County Correctional Facility who 
was in the control room and monitoring security video cameras at the time of the alleged 
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assault, testified that he was at the time in a position to have seen the alleged. He observed 
nothing which corroborated Alfred's and Brown's accusations of assault. R181, at 131 -37. 
Corrections Officer Brett Whittikiend offered testimony similar to that of Officer Cook. R 
181, at 120-24. 
This is not proof such as will satisfy reasonable men of the accused's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
POINT II 
THE CONVICTION OF THREAT AGAINST LIFE OR 
PROPERTY IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendant was found guilty of a violation of § 76-5-107 which purportedly 
involved a threat made against Deputy Jody Edwards. The section proscribes, as criminal, 
several types of antisocial conduct, each of which includes a threat "to commit any offense 
involving violence." 
Subparagraph (l)(b) proscribes the issuance of such a threat with the specific 
"intent to place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury." The "offense involving 
violence" is alleged to be the contract murder of Deputy Edwards. The state obviously relies 
upon this statutory alternative, as clearly the others have no arguable application to the facts 
of this case. 
The alleged terroristic threat consisted of a single statement made in the course 
of a heated argument. The defendant was in custody with his hands cuffed behind his back. 
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He identifies the threatened harm by reference to a "contract," presumably, on the life of 
Edwards' brother. In case it is not apparent from Edwards' response, the "contract" to which 
the defendant referred was either completely ineffectual or an outright fantasy.2 The 
defendant did not seek Edwards out for the purpose of communicating a threat. He did not 
repeat the statement in a attempt to give it a sense of urgency or to demonstrate his 
determination. The evidence that it was made with "intent to place [Edwards] in fear of 
imminent serious bodily injury" is about as compelling as is the evidence that such an 
objective was in fact achieved. 
A spur of the moment threat which is the product of "transitory anger" does not 
evidence a settled purpose to terrorize and is insufficient to support a conviction under 
comparable statutes. See Commonwealth v. Ferrer, 283 Pa.Super. 21,423 A.2d 423 (1980); 
Commonwealth v. Kidd, 296 Pa.Super. 393,442 A.2d 826 (1982) (intoxicated arrestee with 
hands cuffed behind his back repeatedly shouted obscenities and told officers he was going 
to kill them, machine gun them). Cf. Konrad v. State, 763 P.2d 1369 (Alaska App. 1988) 
(suggesting transitory anger would not satisfy requisite mental state under state statute 
proscribing "repeated threats;" upholding conviction where accused had issued a number of 
individual threats interspersed throughout a conversation lasting over a period of 15 
minutes). 
Comparable state statutes have survived constitutional attacks by constructions 
2Deputy Allred testified that Edwards responded to this so-called threat with one 
word: "Whatever." R 181, at 49. 
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or interpretations which held that "idle talk" is outside the purview of the statute. In Thomas 
v. Commonwealth, 574 S.W.2d 903 (Ky.App. 1978), the defendant argued that the Kentucky 
terroristic threat statute was unconstitutional because it contained no requirement that the 
accused act with real intent to carry out the threat or that his words and/or actions convey a 
serious threat. The court rejected the argument as "ludicrous" because the statute was 
obviously not meant to apply to cases involving "idle talk."3 
While upholding a terroristic threat conviction, the court in State v. Schweppe, 
306 Minn. 395,237 N. W.2d 609 (1975), noted that the question of whether a given statement 
constitutes a "threat" within the meaning of the statute must turn upon whether, in it's 
context, it would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that the person making 
the statement will act in according to its tenor. 
The "threat" must, at a minimum, be delivered in a context such as would 
reasonably lead the intended victim to believe that the actor intends to deliver a serious 
threat, rather than an inane insult. Such an intent may be satisfactorily demonstrated (1) by 
"repeated threats" which evidence a settled purpose to terrorize, (2) by the offender's 
earnestness in seeking out the intended victim for the apparent purpose of delivering the 
threat, or (3) by the fact that the threatened harm is of such a nature that it could be inflicted 
3Obviously "idle talk" is no defense to a prank bomb threat where the intent is not 
necessarily to terrorize any person, but to disrupt the use of a public building or 
transportation facility. Such disruptions are often accomplished by means of a "threat" 
which is "obviously" a hoax because public authorities are compelled to err on the side of 
public safety. 
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forthwith. 
It would be difficult to construct a scenario which would represent a better 
example of "transitory anger" than that which is presented by the facts of this case. The 
defendant in the instant case was in a highly emotional state, and although he was angry, 
argumentative and insulting throughout a confrontation which apparently continued over 
several minutes, witnesses identify only one "threat against life."4 
Few "threats" could be more appropriately characterized as "idle talk" than was 
defendant's threat to "put a contract out" on Edwards' life. A contract just like an 
ineffectual and, in all probability, imaginary "contract" on the life of Edwards' brother. 
Finally, there is relevance in the fact that the alleged victim is a police officer.5 
4The other so-called threats which the defendant uttered during the subject incident 
related to procuring the termination of the deputies' employment as peace officers or 
securing a reduction in Deputy Allred's grade. 
5Peace officers are taught how to make good decisions in circumstances which 
would typically evoke an emotional response. In a different context, the following 
observations have been made concerning the attributes of the well-trained peace officer: 
[WJords may or may not be "fighting words," depending upon the 
circumstances of their utterance The words may well have conveyed 
anger and frustration without provoking a violent reaction from the officer.. 
. . [However] a properly trained officer may reasonably be expected to 
"exercise a higher degree of restraint" than the average citizen, and thus be 
less likely to respond belligerently [sic] to "fighting words." 
Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135, 39 L.Ed.2d 214, 220 (1974) (Powell J., 
concurring). 
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POINT III 
JUDICIAL ERROR AND PROSECUTORIAL 
OVERREACHING COMMITTED HEREIN MUST BE 
CONSIDERED PREJUDICIAL AS EVIDENCE OF 
DEFENDANT'S GUILT IS LESS THAN "COMPELLING." 
Judicial error and the prosecutorial overreaching identified below likely 
contributed to the verdict which was reach in this case. Error is more likely to result in harm 
when the evidence of guilt, even if deemed sufficient to sustain a conviction, is not 
"compelling." See State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984); State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781 
(Utah 1992). All error is, in the final analysis, premised upon an act or an omission which 
has or may have resulted in prejudice to one of the litigants. Because all error, "by 
definition," creates at least the possibility of prejudice, the level of one's confidence in any 
verdict is subject to revaluation when error is identified on the record. 
In Troy, supra, the Utah Supreme Court noted: 
"If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct 
or remark will not be presumed prejudicial." [Citation omitted.] 
Likewise, in a case with less compelling proof, this Court will 
more closely scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion of the 
jurors is based on their weighing conflicting evidence or 
evidence susceptible of differing interpretations, there is a 
greater likelihood that they will be improperly influenced 
through remarks of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors 
may be searching for guidance in weighing and interpreting the 
evidence. They may be especially susceptible to influence, and 
a small degree of influence may be sufficient to affect the 
verdict. Counsel is obligated in such cases to avoid, as far as 
possible, any reference to those matters the jury is not justified 
in considering. 
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688P.2d,at486. 
Where the error is substantial, confidence in a verdict which appears to be 
supported by overwhelming evidence may be eroded to the point one must conclude that the 
verdict cannot in good conscience be allowed to stand. Where the evidence of guilt is less 
than compelling, one's confidence in the verdict is naturally shaken when one is confronted 
with error of a much lower magnitude. At that point, the necessity of abandoning the verdict 
becomes a matter of "fair play "-due process of law. When the magnitude of the error is so 
great in comparison to the strength of the evidence of guilt that one is as likely as the other 
to have produced the verdict, it cannot stand as a matter of conscience. 
The court must consider the quality of the state's evidence in determining 
whether the error in this record was prejudicial. 
Eliciting Evidence of "Prior Bad Acts." During direct cross-examination, the state's 
prosecutor pursued a line of questioning which lead to Deputy Alfred's allegation that the 
defendant had assaulted him on a prior occasion. R181, at 35. Alfred told the jury that when 
he responded to defendant's residence at his mother's request who wanted an officer to 
explain "the laws pertaining to dog at large" to her son. He claimed that in the course of this 
encounter the defendant assaulted him, attempting to "hit" the on-duty officer. R 181, at 35. 
This response was not anticipated from the question which drew the response and it initially 
appeared to have been volunteered by a witness who was more than willing to pile on 
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inflammatory and prejudicial allegations of prior bad acts which could not have been elicited 
in the course of a legitimate line of questioning. Defendant immediately objected and moved 
the court to strike Allred's answer. R 181, at 35. 
Prior to ruling, the court invited the state's prosecutor to explain the relevance 
of this evidence. The prosecutor defended the admissibility of this evidence, arguing that it 
"[b]uilds a foundation and explanation for why Deputy Allred treated Brian Starkey the way 
he did that night" and the reasons for his concern regarding the well being of his dog which 
the prosecutor apparently intended to prove had been threatened by the defendant. R 181, 
at 35. The defendant was never held to answer any charge regarding a threat against life or 
property concerning Allred or his "K-9 Unit." Moreover, the attempt to justify the officer's 
lack of proper decorum by offering proof of defendant's prior bad acts, real or imaginary, 
indicates that Allred's answer, although not responsive to the question before him, was 
apparently part of the evidence which the state intended to elicit. It is inexcusable. 
"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith." Utah R.Evid. 
404(b). In State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed 
those policies which underlie this rule of evidence by enumerating the "evils" which it 
addresses: 
The dangers to the fairness and integrity of a trial that can flow 
from prior crime evidence are: 
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(1) The over-strong tendency to believe the accused guilty of the 
charge merely because he is a likely person to do such acts; (2) 
the tendency to condemn not because the accused is believed 
guilty of the present charge but because he has escaped 
unpunished from other offenses; (both (1) and (2) represent the 
principle of undue prejudice;) (3) the injustice of attacking one 
necessarily unprepared to demonstrate that the attacking 
evidence is fabricated (this represents the principle of unfair 
surprise). 
Id., at (quoting Wigmore on Evidence § 58.2, at 1215 (Tillers rev. 1983)). 
Each of these "dangers to [] fairness and integrity" were presented by the facts 
of the instant case, the nature of the offense charged and the character and bona fides of the 
accusation of the prior misconduct. The defendant was on trial for having committed an 
assault upon this same law enforcement officer while on duty on the evening of February 25, 
1998, when he was unexpectedly confronted with the accusation of yet another assault 
against the same officer while the officer was on duty. The potential for prejudice was clear. 
The relevance of this prior bad acts evidence was marginal at best and probed the degree of 
animus existing between the defendant and Allred prior to the date of the incidents in 
question, animus which Allred denied existed, at least on his part. 
The court sustained the defendant's objection but did not order the answer 
stricken or instruct the jury to disregard it. R 181, at 35-36. Defendant obviously did not 
broach this subject during his cross-examination or his own testimony. The jury heard what 
would remain unanswered allegations of misconduct which were comparable to the 
19 
allegations upon which the defendant concerning the incidents which were the subject of 
these proceedings. If any one of the jurors was left with the impression that the unanswered 
allegation was more likely than not true, it is doubtful that such a juror would be seriously 
concerned about returning an adverse verdict on a similar charge, whether or not he or she 
thought that the evidence of guilt was less than satisfactory. 
The potential for prejudice is apparent and given the weakness of the evidence 
supporting the charge of assault by a prison, that conviction must certainly be reversed. 
Cross-examination re "Details" of Prior Felony Conviction. On cross-examination, the 
prosecutor asked the defendant whether or not he had been previously convicted of a felony. 
The defendant answered truthfully that he had been convicted of one such occurrence. R 
181, at 163. The prosecutor then asked what that felony he had been convicted of. Again 
the defendant answered truthfully. R 181, at 163. Apparently unsatisfied with the 
impeachment value of this disclosure, the prosecutor pursued this line of questioning by 
asking the defendant: "The nature of witness tampering, what does that mean? What did you 
do?" R181, at 163. This line of questioning, and the answers that proceeded there from was 
improper and prejudicial. The prosceutor, in effect, invited the defendant to "defend" his 
conduct which led to the prior felony conviction and so engaged him in cross-examination 
concerning not only the underlying facts of that case as well as any tendency to minimize or 
justify his conduct. 
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Generally, inquinc onvictions under rule 609(a) are limited I c. 111 <,; 
nature of the crim c conviction, and the punishment. v i mmett, 
supra* 1 he exp ? of the factual basis underlying a prior conviction which comes into 
ei iikiiee for the purpose of the impeachment oi itit: ilelct nJai il' s credibility, soon degenerates 
into evidence which appears to be of Terul it n the purpose of proving that the defendant is the 
type of person one would cxpetf io be engaged in criminal activity, 
extends bey u vhat and where" of the prior offense, the i^u ial for prejudice 
\ lueli ttU'fids the introduction of any "prior bad acts" nterjected into the case. 
See Discussion above. 
Use of "Rebuttal" as Means of Rehashing State's Case. Rebuttal e\uRitet •• p'opei il 
it is evKinitx' (cpunip Io refute, modify, explain, or otherwise - r nullify the effect 
of ilie opponent's evidence. State v. Winward, - (Utah App. 1995). When the 
defendant rested the prosecutor purported to undertake rebuttal which he used as an 
opportunity to do nothhi; * > ss than have his investigating officer tell hv: side i >Tlhc 
story t lore time. This obviously gave the Stale ivantage. 
Court's Prejudicial Remarks in the i 11 y m*e of the Jury. The contest which generated 
by far the most heat while pro* light was one concerning whether or not 
the officers possessed -t personal animus against the defendant which cxislcd be I ore the 
confrontation giving rise to the instant prosecution and, if so, did these feelings produce an 
exaggerated police response, color officers' perception of events, motivate some officers to 
intentionally distort the facts and, while not justifying defendant's own response, at least shed 
some light upon defendant's otherwise nearly incomprehensible attempt to fain the 
possession of a firearm in such circumstances and upon the magnitude of his own hostility 
and frustration. 
Defendant claimed to have heard hearsay reports of statements which Deputy 
Allred had supposedly made concerning the officers' intent to shoot the defendant on sight. 
Defendant claimed that he was well aware of Allred's feelings about him. Before the 
Defendant's arrest was ever initiated, Deputy Allred apparently knew that the Defendant's 
anticipated response (and attempt to flee) would be all the more probable if he, rather than 
some other uniformed officer initiated the contact. Allred denied any ill will toward the 
defendant notwithstanding defendant's alleged prior attempt to physically assault the deputy 
on an earlier occasion. 
When defense counsel began questioning Allred concerning false allegations 
he had made against the defendant in swearing out the statement of probable cause, the 
state's prosecutor objected on the grounds of relevance. This objection evoked the 
following response from the court which was voiced in the presence of the jury: 
THE COURT: I will allow-you've opened the door. We'll go 
back into everything that was dismissed at preliminary hearing. 
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If they have any incriminating evidence, they could put that on, 
and that counts 
Do you want to try it on that charge as well? We won't add a 
count, but if they have anything that they could counter your 
exploring this area with, they can go into that. It won't be 
irrelevant. Go ahead, 
R 181, at 66. 
11 ,f« ii 11 "• statement, the court discloses that damaging 111 c j a • 1 \ \. i - • • \ > I the only 
charge that was dismissed at the preliminary hearing . <val l\ want this jury to 
hear "everything that was dismissed at p i L 111111 I i; 11 \' (i oaring"? The statement suggests that 
the state may very well • - riminating evidence, they could put f 1 on.'' Iiuk-i \\ 
nothing could :u further from the truth. The state's prosecutor had ahead; \m m»• vil 
more titan lit: could deliver in the way of incriminating evidence i n the process and 
would continue to produce everything he had iflammatory and prejudicial 
material which had little if any rele\ dim 111 i he subject charges. 
The court's allusion to other crimes which tin/ ildrftiiaiii had been previously 
charged with and of which the prosecutor i * i > incriminating evidence" had the 
natural tendency to interject I(H ,iinn i> pc of prejudice that attends the introductior 
types of "prior h;nl acis" evidence. See Discussion above. The court 
c i k a " upon what was obviously a legitimate I in <-li rr»s .-examination, it 
created yet further potential for prejudice to the < Idcit» I,ml 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
lower court must be reversed. 
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